Order Flow and Exchange Rate Dynamics by Martin Evans and David Lyons






Martin D. D. Evans
*   
 












Macroeconomic models of nominal exchange rates perform poorly. In sample, R2 
statistics as high as 10 percent are rare. Out of sample, these models are typi-
cally out-forecast by a naïve random walk. This paper presents a model of a new 
kind. Instead of relying exclusively on macroeconomic determinants, the model 
includes a determinant from the field of microstructure—order flow. Order flow 
is the proximate determinant of price in all microstructure models. This is a 
radically different approach to exchange rate determination. It is also strikingly 
successful in accounting for realized rates. Our model of daily exchange-rate 
changes produces R2 statistics above 50 percent. Out of sample, our model pro-
duces significantly better short-horizon forecasts than a random walk. For the 
DM/$ spot market as a whole, we find that $1 billion of net dollar purchases in-
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Omitted variables is another possible explanation for the lack of explanatory power in 
asset market models. However, empirical researchers have shown considerable imagina-
tion in their specification searches, so it is not easy to think of variables that have es-
caped consideration in an exchange rate equation. 
 
      Richard Meese (1990) 
    
 
1. Motivation: Microstructure Meets Exchange Rate Economics 
 
Since the landmark papers of Meese and Rogoff (1983a, 1983b), exchange 
rate economics has been in crisis. It is in crisis in the sense that current macroeco-
nomic approaches to exchange rates are empirical failures: the proportion of 
monthly exchange rate changes that current models can explain is essentially zero. 
In their survey, Frankel and Rose (1995) write “the Meese and Rogoff analysis at 
short horizons has never been convincingly overturned or explained. It continues to 
exert a pessimistic effect on the field of empirical exchange rate modeling in particu-
lar and international finance in general.” 1 
Which direction to turn is not obvious. Flood and Rose (1995), for example, 
are “driven to the conclusion that the most critical determinants of exchange rate 
volatility are not macroeconomic.” If determinants are not macro fundamentals like 
interest rates, money supplies, and trade balances, then what are they? Two 
alternatives have attracted attention. The first is that exchange rate determinants 
include extraneous variables. These extraneous variables are typically modeled as 
rational speculative bubbles (Blanchard 1979, Dornbusch 1982, Meese 1986, and 
Evans 1986, among others). Though the jury is still out, Flood and Hodrick (1990) 
conclude that the bubble alternative remains unconvincing. A second alternative to 
macro fundamentals is irrationality. For example, exchange rates may be deter-
mined in part from avoidable expectational errors (Dominguez 1986, Frankel and 
Froot 1987, and Hau 1998, among others). On a priori grounds, many economists 
find this second alternative unappealing. Even if one is sympathetic to the presence 
                                                   
1 The relevant literature is vast. Recent surveys include Frankel and Rose (1995), Isard (1995), and 
Taylor (1995).    2
of irrationality, there is a wide gulf between its presence and accounting for ex-
change rates empirically. Until it can produce an empirical account, this too will 
remain an unconvincing alternative.   
Our paper moves in a new direction: the microeconomics of asset pricing. This 
direction makes available a rich set of models from the field of microstructure 
finance. These models are largely new to exchange rate economics, and in this sense 
they provide a fresh approach. For example, microstructure models direct attention 
to new variables, variables that have “escaped the consideration” of macroecono-
mists (borrowing from the opening quote). The most important of these variables is 
order flow.2 Order flow is the proximate determinant of price in all microstructure 
models. (That order flow determines price is therefore robust to differences in 
market structure, which makes this property more general than it might seem.) Our 
analysis draws heavily on this causal link from order flow to price. One level deeper, 
microstructure models also provide discipline for thinking about how order flow itself 
is determined. Information is key here—in particular, information that currency 
markets need to aggregate. This can include traditional macro fundamentals, but is 
not limited to them. In sum, our microeconomic approach provides a new type of 
alternative to the traditional macro approach, one that does not rely on extraneous 
information or irrationality.3    
Turning to the data, we find that order flow does indeed matter for exchange-
rate determination. By “matter” we mean that order flow explains most of the 
variation in nominal exchange rates over periods as long as four months. The graphs 
below provide a convenient summary of this explanatory power. The solid lines are 
the spot rates of the DM and Yen against the Dollar over our four-month sample 
(May 1 to August 31, 1996). The dashed lines are marketwide order-flow for the 
respective currencies. Order flow, denoted by x, is the sum over time of signed trades 
between foreign exchange dealers worldwide.4 
                                                   
2 Order flow is a measure of buying/selling pressure. It is the net of buyer-initiated orders and seller-
initiated orders. In a dealer market such as spot foreign exchange, it is the dealers who absorb this 
order flow, and they are compensated for doing so. (In an auction market, limit orders absorb the flow 
of market orders.)    
3 Another alternative to traditional macro modeling is the recent “new open-economy macro” 
approach (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995). We do not address this approach in this paragraph 
because, as yet, it has not produced an empirical literature. 
4 For example, if a dealer initiates a trade against another dealer's DM/$ quote, and that trade is a $  
purchase (sale), then order flow is +1 (–1). These are cumulated across dealers over each 24-hour   3
Figure 1 
Four Months of Exchange Rates (solid) and Order Flow (dashed) 
May 1-August 31, 1996 
 




Order flow and nominal exchange rates are strongly positively correlated (price 
increases with buying pressure). Macroeconomic exchange rate models, in contrast, 
produce virtually no correlation over periods as short as four months.  
To address this more formally, we develop and estimate a model that in-
cludes both macroeconomic determinants (e.g., interest rates) and a microstructure 
determinant (order flow). Our estimates verify the significance of the above correla-
tion. The model accounts for about 60 percent of daily changes in the DM/$ ex-
change rate. For comparison, macro models rarely account for even 10 percent of 
monthly changes. Our daily frequency is noteworthy: though our model draws from 
microstructure, it is not estimated at the transaction frequency. Daily analysis is in 
the missing middle between past microstructure work (tick-by-tick data) and past 
macro work (monthly data). Bridging the two helps clarify how lower-frequency 
exchange rates emerge from the market’s operation in real time. 
                                                                                                                                                       
trading day (weekend trading—which is minimal—is included in Monday). In spot foreign exchange, 
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To complement these in-sample results, we also examine the model’s out-of-
sample forecasting ability. Work by Meese and Rogoff (1983a) examines short-
horizon forecasts (1 to 12 months). They find that a random walk model out-
forecasts the leading macro models, even when macro-model “forecasts” are based on 
realized future fundamentals. Subsequent work lengthens the horizon beyond 12 
months and finds that macro models begin to dominate the random walk (Meese and 
Rogoff 1983b, Chinn 1991, Chinn and Meese 1994, and Mark 1995). But results at 
shorter horizons remain a puzzle. Here we examine horizons of less than one month. 
(Transaction data sets that are currently available are too short to generate 
statistical power at monthly horizons.) We find that at horizons from one-day to two-
weeks, our model produces better forecasts than the random-walk model (over 30 
percent lower root mean squared error).  
The relation we find between exchange rates and order flow is not inconsis-
tent with the macro approach, but it does raise several concerns. Under the macro 
approach, order flow should not matter for exchange rate determination: macroeco-
nomic information is publicly available—it is impounded in exchange rates without 
the need for order flow. More precisely, the macro approach typically assumes that: 
(1) all information relevant for exchange rate determination is common knowledge; 
and (2) the mapping from that information to equilibrium prices is also common 
knowledge. If either of these two assumptions is relaxed, however, then order flow 
will convey information about market-clearing prices. Relaxing the second assump-
tion should not be controversial, given the failure of current exchange-rate models. 
Direct evidence, too, corroborates that order flow conveys relevant information 
(Lyons 1995, Yao 1997, Covrig and Melvin 1998, Ito, Lyons and Melvin 1998, 
Cheung and Wong 1998, Bjonnes and Rime 1998, Evans 1999, Naranjo and 
Nimalendran 1999, and Payne 1999.)5      
                                                   
5 The standard example of order flow that conveys non-public information is orders from central bank 
intervention. (Within our four-month sample, however, the Fed never intervened.) Probably more 
important on an ongoing basis is order flow that conveys information about “portfolio shifts” that are 
not common knowledge. A recent event provides a sharp example. Major banks attribute the 
yen/dollar rate’s drop from 145 to 115 in Fall 1998 to “the unwinding of positions by hedge funds that 
had borrowed in cheap yen to finance purchases of higher-yielding dollar assets” (The Economist, 
10/10/98). This unwinding—and the selling of dollars that came with it—was forced by the scaling 
back of speculative leverage in the months following the Long Term Capital Management crisis. 
These trades were not common knowledge as they were occurring. (See also section 6 below, and Cai 
et al. 1999.)  
   5
Note that order flow being a proximate determinant of exchange rates does 
not preclude macro fundamentals from being the underlying determinant. Macro 
fundamentals in exchange rate equations may be so imprecisely measured that 
order-flow provides a better “proxy” of their variation. This interpretation of order 
flow as a proxy for macro fundamentals is particularly plausible with respect to 
expectations: standard empirical measures of expected future fundamentals are 
obviously imprecise.6 Orders, on the other hand, reflect a willingness to back one's 
beliefs with real money (unlike survey-based measures of expectations). Measuring 
order flow under this interpretation is akin to counting the backed-by-money 
expectational votes.  
This paper has six remaining sections. Section 2 contrasts the micro and 
macro approaches to exchange rates. Section 3 develops a model that includes both 
micro and macro determinants. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 presents our 
results. Section 6 provides perspective on our results. Section 7 concludes.  
  
 
2. Models:  Spanning the Micro-Macro Divide 
 
A core distinction between a microstructure approach to exchange rates and 
the traditional macro approach is the role of trades in price determination. In macro 
models, trades have no distinct role in determining price. In microstructure models, 
trades have a leading role—they are the proximate cause of price adjustment. It is 
instructive to frame this distinction by contrasting the structural models that 
emerge from these two approaches.  
 
Structural Models: Macro Approach 
Exchange-rate models within the macro approach are typically estimated at 
the monthly frequency. When estimated in changes they take the form: 
 
(1) Dpt  =  f(Di, Dm, …)   +   et. 
 
where Dpt is the change in the log nominal exchange rate over the month (DM/$). 
                                                   
6  One might argue that expectations measurement cannot be driving the negative results of Meese 
and Rogoff because they use the driving variables’ realized values. However, if the underlying macro   6
The driving variables in the function f(Di,Dm,…) include changes in home and 
foreign nominal interest rates i, money supply m, and other macro determinants, 
denoted here by the ellipsis.7 Changes in these public-information variables drive 
price—there is no role for order flow. Any incidental price effects from order flow 
that might arise are subsumed in the residual et. These models are logically coherent 
and intuitively appealing. Unfortunately, they account for almost none of the 
monthly variation in floating exchange rates.  
 
Structural Models: Microstructure Approach 
Equations of exchange-rate determination within the microstructure ap-
proach are derived from the optimization problem faced by price setters in the 
market—the dealers.8 These models are all variations on the following specification: 
 
(2) Dpt  =  g(Dx, DI, …)   +   nt 
 
Now Dpt is the DM/$ rate change over two transactions, rather than over a month as 
in the macro models. The driving variables in the function g(Dx,DI,…) include order 
flow Dx, the change in net dealer positions (or inventory) DI, and other micro 
determinants, denoted by the ellipsis. Order flow can take both positive and 
negative values because the counterparty either purchases (+) at the dealer’s offer or 
sells at the dealer’s bid (–). Here we use the convention that a positive Dx is net 
dollar purchases, making the theoretical relation positive: net dollar purchases drive 
up the DM price of dollars. It is interesting to note that the residual in this case is 
the mirror image of the residual in equation 1: it subsumes any price changes due to 
determinants in the macro model f(Di,Dm,…), whereas the residual in equation 1 
subsumes price changes due to determinants in the micro model g(Dx,DI,…). 
                                                                                                                                                       
model is incomplete, then realized values still produce an incorrect expectations measure.   
7  The precise list of determinants depends on the model. Meese and Rogoff (1983a) focus on three 
models in particular: the flexible-price monetary model, the sticky-price monetary model, and the 
sticky-price asset model. Here our interest is simply a broad-brush contrast between the macro and 
microstructure approaches. For specific models see Frenkel (1976), Dornbusch (1976), and Mussa 
(1976), among many others.  
8  Empirical work using structural micro models includes Glosten and Harris (1988), Madhavan and 
Smidt (1991), and Foster and Viswanathan (1993), all of which address the NYSE. Structural models 
in a multiple-dealer setting include Snell and Tonks (1995) for stocks, Lyons (1995) for currencies, 
and Vitale (1998) for bonds.   
   7
Microstructure models predict a positive relation between Dp and Dx because 
order flow communicates non-public information, and once communicated, it is 
reflected in price. For example, if there is an agent who has superior information 
about the value of an asset, and that information advantage induces the agent to 
trade, then a dealer can learn from those trades (purchases indicate good news 
about the asset’s value, and vice versa). Empirically, estimates of a relation between 
Dp and Dx at the transaction frequency are uniformly positive and significant. This 
is true for many different markets, including stocks, bonds, and foreign exchange.  
The relation in microstructure models between Dp and DI is not our focus in 
this paper, but let us clarify nonetheless. This relation is referred to as the inven-
tory-control effect on price. The inventory-control effect arises when a dealer adjusts 
his price to control fluctuation in his inventory. For example, if a dealer has a larger 
long position than is desired, he may shade his bid and offer downward to induce a 
customer purchase, thereby reducing his position. This affects realized transaction 
prices, which accounts for the relation. (These idiosyncratic inventory effects on 
individual dealer prices do not arise in the model developed in the next section.)  
 
Spanning the Micro-Macro Divide 
To span the divide between the micro and macro approaches, we develop a 
model with components from both:9 
 
(3) Dpt  =  f(Di,…)   +   g(Dx,…)   +   ht. 
 
The challenge is the frequency mismatch: transaction frequency for the micro 
models versus monthly frequency for the macro models. In the next section we 
develop a model in the spirit of equation (3). We estimate the model at the daily 
frequency by using micro determinants that are time-aggregated. We focus in 
particular on order flow Dx. Our time-aggregated measure spans a much longer 
period than is addressed elsewhere within empirical microstructure. 
                                                   
9 Goldberg and Tenorio (1997) develop a model for the Russian ruble market that includes both macro 
and microstructure components. Osler’s (1998) trading model includes macroeconomic “current 
account traders” who affect the exchange rate in flow equilibrium.   8
3.  Portfolio Shifts Model 
 
Overview 
One source of exchange rate variation in the model is portfolio shifts on the 
part of the public. These portfolio shifts have two important features. First, they are 
not common knowledge as they occur. Second, they are large enough that clearing 
the market requires adjustment of the spot exchange rate.   
  The first feature—that portfolio shifts are not common knowledge—provides 
a role for order flow. At the beginning of each day, public portfolio shifts are mani-
fested in orders in the foreign exchange market. These orders are not publicly 
observable. Dealers take the other side of these orders, and then trade among 
themselves during the day to share the resulting inventory risk. The market learns 
about the initial portfolio shifts by observing this interdealer trading activity. By the 
end of the day, the dealers’ inventory risk is shared with the public. 
 The second important feature is that the initial portfolio shifts, once absorbed 
by the public at the end of the day, are large enough to move price. This requires 
that the public’s demand for foreign-currency assets is less than perfectly elastic.10 If 
the public’s demand is less than perfectly elastic, different-currency assets are 
imperfect substitutes, and price adjustment is required to clear the market. In this 
sense, our model is in the spirit of the portfolio balance approach to exchange rates. 
In another sense, however, our model is very different from that earlier approach. 
Portfolio balance models are driven by changes in asset supply. Asset supply is 
constant in our model. Rather, our model identifies two distinct components on the 
demand side. The first is driven by innovations in public information (standard 
macro fundamentals). The second is driven by non-public information. This non-
public information takes the form of portfolio shifts. The model does not take a stand 
on the underlying determinants of these portfolio shifts (though we do address this 
issue in section 6).   
 
 
                                                   
10 Evidence that asset demand curves slope down is provided by Scholes (1972) and Shleifer (1986), 
among many others.  
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Specifics 
Consider a pure exchange economy with T periods and two assets, one risk-
less, and one with a stochastic payoff representing foreign exchange. The time-T 
payoff on foreign exchange, denoted F, is composed of a series of increments, so that 
F=￿ =
T
1 t t r . The increments rt are i.i.d. Normal(0,Sr) and are observed before trading 
in each period. These realized increments represent the flow of publicly available 
macroeconomic information over time (e.g., changes in interest rates).  
The foreign exchange market is organized as a decentralized dealership mar-
ket with N dealers, indexed by i, and a continuum of non-dealer customers (the 
public), indexed by z˛[0,1]. Within each period (day) there are three rounds of 
trading. In the first round dealers trade with the public. In the second round dealers 
trade among themselves to share the resulting inventory risk. In the third round 
dealers trade again with the public to share inventory risk more broadly. The timing 
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The dealers and customers all have identical negative exponential utility defined 
over time-T wealth. 
 
Trading Round 1 
 At the beginning of each period t, all market participants observe rt, the 
period’s increment to the payoff F. On the basis of this increment and other avail-  10
able information, each dealer simultaneously and independently quotes a scalar 
price to his customers at which he agrees to buy and sell any amount.11 We denote 
this round-one price of dealer i as Pi1. (To ease the notational burden, we suppress 
the period subscript t when clarity permits.) Each dealer then receives a net 
customer-order realization ci1 that is executed at his quoted price Pi1, where ci1<0 
denotes a net customer sale (dealer i purchase). Each of these N customer-order 
realizations is distributed Normal(0,Sc1), and they are independent across dealers. 
(Think of these initial customer trades as assigned—or preferenced—to a single 
dealer, resulting from bilateral customer relationships for example.) Customer 
orders are also distributed independently of the public-information increment rt.12 
These orders represent portfolio shifts on the part of the non-dealer public. Their 
realizations are not publicly observable. 
 
Trading Round 2 
  Round 2 is the interdealer trading round. Each dealer simultaneously and 
independently quotes a scalar price to other dealers at which he agrees to buy and 
sell any amount. These interdealer quotes are observable and available to all 
dealers in the market. Each dealer then simultaneously and independently trades 
on other dealers’ quotes. Orders at a given price are split evenly across any dealers 
quoting that price. Let Ti2 denote the (net) interdealer trade initiated by dealer i in 
round two. At the close of round 2, all dealers observe the net interdealer order flow 









2   
 
Note that interdealer order flow is observed without noise, which maximizes the 
difference in transparency across trade types: customer-dealer trades are not 
                                                   
11 The sizes tradable at quoted prices in major FX markets are very large relative to other markets. 
At the time of our sample, the standard quote in DM/$ was good for up to $10 million, with a tiny bid-
offer spread, typically less than four basis points. Introducing a bid-offer spread (or price schedule) in 
round one to endogenize the number of dealers is a straightforward—but distracting—extension of 
our model.  
12 A natural extension of this specification is that customer orders reflect changing expectations of 
future rt.   11
publicly observed but interdealer trades are observed. In reality, FX trades between 
customers and dealers are not publicly observed. Though signals of interdealer order 
flow are publicly observed, it is not the case that these trades are observed without 
noise. Adding noise to Eq. (4), however, has no qualitative impact on our estimating 
equation, so we stick to this simpler specification. 
 
Trading Round 3 
 In round 3, dealers share overnight risk with the non-dealer public. Unlike 
round 1, the public’s motive for trading in round 3 is non-stochastic and purely 
speculative. Initially, each dealer simultaneously and independently quotes a scalar 
price Pi3 at which he agrees to buy and sell any amount. These quotes are observ-
able and available to the public at large. 
The mass of customers on the interval [0,1] is large (in a convergence sense) 
relative to the N dealers. This implies that the dealers’ capacity for bearing over-
night risk is small relative to the public’s capacity. Dealers therefore set prices so 
that the public willingly absorbs dealer inventory imbalances, and each dealer ends 
the day with no net position. These round-3 prices are conditioned on the round-2 
interdealer order flow. The interdealer order flow informs dealers of the size of the 
total inventory that the public needs to absorb to achieve stock equilibrium. 
Knowing the size of the total inventory the public needs to absorb is not suffi-
cient for determining round-3 prices. Dealers also need to know the risk-bearing 
capacity of the public. We assume it is less than infinite. Specifically, given negative 
exponential utility, the public’s total demand for the risky asset in round-3, denoted 
c3, is a linear function of the its expected return conditional on public information: 
 
c3  =  g(E[P3,t+1|W3]-P3,t) 
 
where the positive coefficient g captures the aggregate risk-bearing capacity of the 
public, and W3 is the public information available at the time of trading in round 3.  
 
Equilibrium 
 The dealer’s problem is defined over four choice variables, the three scalar   12
quotes Pi1, Pi2, and Pi3, and the dealer’s interdealer trade Ti2 (the latter being a 
component of Dx, the interdealer order flow). The appendix provides details of the 
model’s solution. Here we provide some intuition. Consider the three scalar quotes.  
No arbitrage ensures that, within a given round, all dealers quote a common price. 
Given that all dealers quote a common price, this price is necessarily conditioned on 
common information only. Though rt is common information at the beginning of 
round 1, order flow Dxt is not observed until the end of round 2. The price for round-3 
trading, P3, therefore reflects the information in both rt and Dxt. 
 Whether Dx does influence price depends on whether it communicates any 
price-relevant information. The answer is yes. Understanding why requires a few 
steps. First, the appendix shows that it is optimal for each dealer to trade in round 2 
according to the trading rule: 
 
Ti2  =  a ci1 
  
with a constant coefficient a. Thus, each dealer’s trade in round 2 is proportional to 
the customer order he receives in round 1. This implies that when dealers observe 
the interdealer order flow Dx=SiTi2 at the end of round 2, they can infer the aggre-
gate portfolio shift on the part of the public in round 1 (the sum of the N realizations 
of ci1). Dealers also know that the public needs to be induced to re-absorb this 
portfolio shift in round 3. This inducement requires a price adjustment. Hence the 
relation between the interdealer order flow and the subsequent price adjustment.  
 
The Pricing Relation 
The appendix establishes that the change in price from the end of period t-1 
to the end of period t is: 
 
(5) DPt =  rt   +  lDxt 
 
where l is a positive constant. That this price change includes the innovation in 
payoffs rt one-for-one is unsurprising. The lDxt term is the portfolio shift term. This 
term reflects the price adjustment required to induce re-absorption of the public's   13
portfolio shift from round 1. For intuition, note that lDx=lSiTi2=laSici1. The sum 
Sici1 is this total portfolio shift from round 1. The public's total demand in round 3, 
c3, is not perfectly elastic, and l insures that at the round-3 price c3+Sici1 =0. 
 
Empirical Implementation 
 Getting from equation (5) to an estimable model requires that we specialize 
the macro component of the model—the public-information increment rt. We choose 
to specialize this component to capture changes in the nominal interest differential. 
That is, we define rt ” D(it–it*), where it is the nominal dollar interest rate and it* is 
the nominal non-dollar interest rate (DM or Yen). This yields the following regres-
sion model: 
 
(6)   DPt =  b1D(it–it*) + b2Dxt + ht   
 
Our choice of specialization has some advantages. First, this specification is 
consistent with monetary macro models in the sense that these models call for 
estimating DP using the interest differential’s change, not its level. (As a diagnostic, 
though, we also estimate the model using the level of the differential, a la Uncovered 
Interest Parity; see footnote 17.) Second, in asset-approach macro models like the 
Dornbusch (1976) overshooting model, innovations in the interest differential are 
the main engine of exchange rate variation.13 Third, from a purely practical perspec-
tive, data on the interest differential are readily available at the daily frequency, 
which is certainly not the case for the other standard macro fundamentals (e.g., real 
output, nominal money supplies, etc.).  
Naturally, this specification of our macro component of the model has some 
drawbacks. It is certainly true that, as a measure of variation in macro fundamen-
tals, the interest differential is obviously incomplete. One can view it as an attempt 
to control for this key macro determinant in order to examine the importance of 
micro determinants. One should not view it as establishing a fair horse race between 
the micro and macro approaches. 
                                                   
13 Cheung and Chinn (1998) corroborate this empirically. Their surveys of foreign exchange traders 
show that the importance of individual macroeconomic variables shifts over time, but “interest rates 
always appear to be important.”   14
4.  Data 
 
Our data set contains time-stamped, tick-by-tick data on actual transactions 
for the two largest spot markets—DM/$ and ¥/$—over a four-month period, May 1 
to August 31, 1996. These data were collected from the Reuters Dealing 2000-1 
system via an electronic feed customized for the purpose. Dealing 2000-1 is the most 
widely used electronic dealing system. According to Reuters, over 90 percent of the 
world's direct interdealer transactions take place through the system.14 All trades on 
this system take the form of bilateral electronic conversations. The conversation is 
initiated when a dealer uses the system to call another dealer to request a quote. 
Users are expected to provide a fast two-way quote with a tight spread, which is in 
turn dealt or declined quickly (i.e., within seconds). To settle disputes, Reuters keeps 
a temporary record of all bilateral conversations. This record is the source of our 
data. (Reuters was unable to provide the identity of the trading partners for 
confidentiality reasons.) 
For every trade executed on D2000-1, our data set includes a time-stamped 
record of the transaction price and a bought/sold indicator. The bought/sold indicator 
allows us to sign trades for measuring order flow. This is a major advantage: we do 
not have to use the noisy algorithms used elsewhere in the literature for signing 
trades. A drawback is that it is not possible to identify the size of individual transac-
tions.15 For model estimation, order flow Dx is therefore measured as the difference 
between the number of buyer-initiated trades and the number of seller-initiated 
trades.  
Three features of the data are especially noteworthy. First, they provide 
transaction information for the whole interbank market over the full 24-hour 
trading day. This contrasts with earlier transaction data sets covering single dealers 
over some fraction of the trading day (Lyons 1995, Yao 1998, and Bjonnes and Rime 
1998). Our comprehensive data set makes it possible, for the first time, to analyze 
                                                   
14  As noted in footnote 3, interdealer transactions account for about 75 percent of total trading in 
major spot markets. This 75 percent from interdealer trading breaks into two transaction types, 
direct and brokered. Direct trading accounts for about 60 percent of interdealer trade and brokered 
trading accounts for about 40 percent. For more detail on the Reuters Dealing 2000-1 System see 
Lyons (1995) and Evans (1997).  
15 This drawback may not be acute. There is evidence that the size of trades has no information 
content beyond that contained in the number of transactions. See Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994).   15
order flow's role in price determination at the level of “the market.” Though other 
data sets exist that cover multiple dealers, they include only brokered interdealer 
transactions (see  Goodhart, Ito and Payne 1996, and Payne 1999). More important, 
these other data sets come from a particular brokered-trading system, one that 
accounts for a much smaller fraction of daily trading volume than the D2000-1 
system covered by our data set. (There is also evidence that dealers attach more 
informational importance to direct interdealer order flow than to brokered inter-
dealer order flow. See Bjonnes and Rime 1998.)  
Second, our market-wide transactions data are not observed by individual FX 
dealers as they trade. Though dealers have access to their own transaction records, 
they cannot observe others' transactions on the system. Our data therefore repre-
sent activity that, at the time, participants could only infer indirectly. This is one of 
those rare situations where the researcher has more information than market 
participants themselves (at least in this dimension).  
 Third, our data cover a relatively long time span (four months) in comparison 
with other micro data sets. This is important because the longer time span allows us 
to address exchange-rate determination from more of an asset-pricing perspective 
than was possible with previous micro data spanning only days or weeks.  
 The three variables in our Portfolio Shifts model are measured as follows. 
The change in the spot rate (DM/$ or ¥/$), Dpt, is the log change in the purchase 
transaction price between 4 pm (GMT) on day t and 4 pm on day t-1. When a 
purchase transaction does not occur precisely at 4 pm, we use the subsequent 
purchase transaction (with roughly 1 million trades per day, the subsequent 
transaction is generally within a few seconds of 4 pm). When day t is a Monday, the 
day t-1 price is the previous Friday’s price. (Our dependent variable therefore spans 
the full four months of our sample, with no overnight or weekend breaks.) The daily 
order flow, Dxt, is the difference between the number of buyer-initiated trades and 
the number of seller-initiated trades (in thousands), also measured from 4 pm 
(GMT) on day t-1 to 4 pm on day t (negative sign denotes net dollar sales).  The 
change in interest differential, D(it–it*), is calculated from the daily overnight 
interest rates for the dollar, the deutschemark, and the yen (annual basis); the 
source is Datastream (typically measured at approximately 4 pm GMT).   16
 5.  Empirical Results 
 
Our empirical results are grouped in four sets. The first set addresses the in-
sample fit of the portfolio shifts model. The second set addresses robustness issues. 
The third set addresses the direction of causality. The fourth set of results addresses 
the model’s out-of-sample forecasting ability (in the spirit of Meese and Rogoff 
1983a).  
 
5.1  In-Sample Fit 
Table 1 presents our estimates of the portfolio shifts model (equation 6) using 
daily data for the DM/$ and ¥/$ exchange rates. Specifically, we estimate the 
following regression:  
 
(7) Dpt =  b1D(it–it*) + b2Dxt + ht   
 
where Dpt is the change in the log spot rate (DM/$ or ¥/$) from the end of day t-1 to 
the end of day t, D(it–it*) is the change in the overnight interest differential from day 
t-1 to day t (* denotes DM or ¥), and Dxt is the order flow from the end of day t-1 to 
the end of day t (negative denotes net dollar sales).16 
The coefficient b2 on our portfolio shift variable Dxt is correctly signed and 
significant, with t-statistics above 5 in both equations. To see that the sign is 
correct, recall from the model that net purchases of dollars—a positive Dxt—should 
lead to a higher DM price of dollars. The traditional macro-fundamental—the 
interest differential—is correctly signed, but is only significant in the yen equation. 
(The sign should be positive because, in the sticky-price monetary model for exam-
ple, an increase in the dollar interest rate it requires an immediate dollar apprecia-
tion—increase in DM/$—to make room for the expected dollar depreciation required 
by uncovered interest parity.) The overall fit of the model is striking relative to 
                                                   
16 Though the dependent variable in standard macro models is the change in the log spot rate, the 
dependent variable in the Portfolio Shifts model in equation (6) is the change in the spot rate without 
taking logs. These two measures for the dependent variable produce nearly identical results in all our 
tables (R2s, coefficient significance, lack of autocorrelation, etc.). Here we present the log change 
results—equation 7—to make them directly comparable to previous macro specifications.   
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traditional macro models, with R2 statistics of 64 percent and 45 percent for the DM 
and  yen equations, respectively. In terms of diagnostics, the DM equation shows 
some evidence of heteroskedasticity, so we correct the standard errors in that 
equation using a heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (White correc-




In-sample fit of portfolio shifts model 
 
Dpt =  b1D(it–it*) + b2Dxt + ht 
 
 















           
DM  0.52  2.10  0.64  0.78  0.08 
  (0.35)  (0.20) 
 
 
  0.41  0.02 
Yen  2.48  2.90  0.45  0.50  0.96 
  (0.92)  (0.46) 
 
  0.37  0.71 
 
The dependent variable Dpt is the change in the log spot exchange rate from 4 pm GMT on day t-1 to 
4 pm GMT on day t (DM/$ or ¥/$). The regressor D(it–it*) is the change in the one-day interest 
differential from day t-1 to day t (* denotes DM or ¥, annual basis). The regressor Dxt is interdealer 
order flow between 4 pm GMT on day t-1 and 4 pm GMT on day t (negative for net dollar sales, in 
thousands). Estimated using OLS. Standard errors are shown in parentheses (corrected for 
heteroskedasticity in the case of the DM). The sample spans four months (May 1 to August 31, 1996), 
which is 89 trading days. The Serial column presents the p-value of a chi-squared test for residual 
serial correlation, first-order in the top row and fifth-order (one week) in the bottom row. The Hetero 
column presents the p-value of a chi-squared test for ARCH in the residuals, first-order in the top 
row and fifth-order in the bottom row. 
                                                   
17 To check robustness, we examine several obvious variations on the model. For example, in the 
spirit of Uncovered Interest Parity, we include the level of the interest differential in lieu of its 
change. The level of the differential is insignificant in both cases. We also include a constant in the 
regression, even though the model does not call for one. The constant is insignificant for both 
currencies. Estimating the whole model in levels rather than changes produces a pattern similar to 
that in Table 1: order flow is highly significant, the interest differential is insignificant, and R2 is 0.75 
for the DM equation and 0.61 for the Yen equation. With this levels regressions, however, beyond the 
usual concerns about non-stationarity, there is also strong evidence of serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity (both tests are significant at the 1 percent level for both currencies). Finally, recall 
that our price series is measured from purchase transactions. Results using 4 pm sale prices are 
identical. We address additional robustness issues in the next subsection.   18
The size of our order flow coefficient is consistent with past estimates based 
on single-dealer data. The coefficient of 2.1 in the DM equation implies that a day 
with 1000 more dollar purchases than sales induces an increase in the DM price by 
2.1 percent. Given the average trade size in our sample of $3.9 million, $1 billion of 
net dollar purchases increases the DM price of a dollar by 0.54% (= 2.1/3.9). At a 
spot rate of 1.5 DM/$, this implies that $1 billion of net dollar purchases increases 
the DM price of a dollar by 0.8 pfennig. At the single-dealer level, Lyons (1995) finds 
that information asymmetry induces the dealer he tracks to increase price by 1/100th 
of a pfennig (0.0001 DM) for every incoming buy order of $10 million. That trans-
lates to 1 pfennig per $1 billion. Though linearly extrapolating this estimate is 
certainly not an accurate description of single-dealer behavior, with multiple dealers 
it may be a good description of the market’s aggregate elasticity. 
The striking explanatory power of these regressions is almost wholly due to 
order flow Dxt. Regressing Dpt on D(it–it*) alone, plus a constant, produces an R2 
statistic less than 1 percent in both equations, and coefficients on D(it–it*) that are 
insignificant at the 5 percent level.18 That the interest differential regains signifi-
cance once order flow is included, at least in the Yen equation, is consistent with 
omitted variable bias in the interest-rates-only specification. (The correlation 
between the two regressors Dxt and D(it–it*) is 0.02 for the DM and –0.27 for the 
Yen, though both are insignificant at the 5 percent level.) 
Order flow’s ability to account for the full four months of exchange rate varia-
tion is surprising, not only from the perspective of macro exchange rate economics, 
but also from the perspective of microstructure finance. Recall from section 2 that 
structural models within microstructure finance are typically estimated at the 
transaction frequency—they make no attempt to account for prices over the full 24-
hour day. Our regression is at the daily frequency. One might have conjectured that 
the net impact of order flow over the day would be zero (each day accounts for about 
one million transactions). This conjecture would be consistent with a belief that 
                                                   
18 There is a vast empirical literature that attempts to increase the explanatory power of interest 
rates in exchange rate equations by introducing interest rates as separate regressors, introducing 
non-linear specifications, etc. This literature has not been successful, so we do not pursue this line 
here. Note that the lack of explanatory power from traditional fundamentals is not unique to 
exchange rate economics: Roll (1988) produces R2s of only 20% using traditional equity fundamentals 
to account for daily stock returns, a result he describes as a “significant challenge to our science.”      19
cumulative order flow mean-reverts rapidly (e.g., within a day). But rapid mean 
reversion is clearly not the behavior displayed by cumulative order flow in Figure 1. 
This lack of mean reversion provides some room for the lower frequency relation we 
find here.  
The lack of strong mean reversion in our measured order flow deserves fur-
ther attention, particularly considering that half-lives of individual dealer positions 
can be as short as 10 minutes (Lyons 1998). The key lies in recognizing that our 
measure of order flow reflects interdealer trading, not customer-dealer trading. 
Consider a scenario that illustrates why our measure in Figure 1 can be so persis-
tent. (Recall that Figure 1 displays cumulative order flow, defined as the sum of 
interdealer order flow, Dxt, from 0 to t.) Starting the scenario from xt=0, an initial 
customer sale does not move xt from zero because xt measures interdealer order flow 
only. After the customer sale, then when dealer i unloads the position by selling to 
another dealer j, xt drops to –1. A subsequent sale by dealer j to another dealer, 
dealer k, reduces xt further to –2.19 If a customer happens to buy dealer k’s position 
from him, then xt remains at –2. In this simple scenario, order flow measured only 
from trades between customers and dealers would have reverted to zero—the 
concluding customer trade offsets the initiating customer trade. The interdealer 
order flow, however, does not revert to zero. Note, too, that this difference in the 
persistence of the two order-flow measures—customer-dealer versus interdealer—is 
also a property of the Portfolio Shifts model. In the Portfolio Shifts model, customer 
order flow in round 3 always offsets the customer order flow in round 1. But the 
interdealer order flow, which only arises in round 2, does not net to zero. This non-
zero Dxt serves as a carrier of value in our estimating equation.     
 
5.2  Robustness 
 
In this section we address three robustness issues beyond those examined in 
the previous section. They correspond to the following three questions: (1) Might the 
order-flow/price relation be non-linear? (2) Does the relation depend on the gross 
level of activity? and (3) Does the relation depend on day of the week?  
                                                   
19 This repeated passing of dealer positions in the foreign exchange market is referred to as the “hot 
potato” phenomenon. See Burnham (1991) and Lyons (1997).   20
Might the order-flow/price relation be non-linear? 
 The linearity of our Portfolio Shifts specification depends crucially on several 
simplifying assumptions, some of which are rather strong on empirical grounds. It is 
therefore natural to investigate whether non-linearities or asymmetries might be 
present.20 A simple first test is to add a squared order-flow term to the baseline 
specification. The squared order-flow term is insignificant in both equations. We also 
test whether the coefficient on order flow is piece-wise linear, with a kink at Dxt=0. If 
true, this means that buying pressure and selling pressure are not symmetric. A 
Wald test that the two slope coefficients are equal cannot be rejected for the DM 
equation. There is some evidence of different slopes in the Yen equation however: 
the test is rejected at the 4 percent marginal significance level. In that case, the 
point estimates show a greater sensitivity of price to order flow in the downward 
direction, though both estimates remain positive and significant. 
 
Does the order-flow/price relation depend on the gross level of activity? 
 Another natural concern is whether the order-flow/price relation in Table 1 is 
state contingent in some way, perhaps depending on the market’s overall activity 
level. Our data set provides a convenient measure of overall activity, namely the 
total number of transactions. As a simple test, we partition our sample of trading 
days into quartiles, from days with the fewest transactions to days with the most 
transactions. We then estimate separate order-flow coefficients for each of these four 
sample partitions. In both the DM and Yen equations, all four of the order-flow 
coefficients are positive. In the DM equation, the coefficients are slightly U-shaped 
(from fewest transactions to most, the point estimates for b2 are 2.7, 2.0, 1.9, and 
3.3). In the Yen equation, the coefficients are monotonically increasing (from fewest 
transactions to most, the point estimates for b2 are 1.0, 1.1, 3.5, and 4.1).  
 In terms of theory, this result for the Yen is consistent with the “event-
uncertainty” model of Easley and O’Hara (1992), but the DM result is not. The 
event-uncertainty model predicts that trades are more informative when trading 
intensity is higher. Key to understanding their result is that in their model, new 
                                                   
20 We pursue these (simple) non-linear specifications with the comfort that outliers are not driving 
our results—a fact that is manifest from Figure 1.     
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information may not exist. If there is trading at time t, then a rational dealer raises 
her conditional probability that an information event has occurred, and lowers the 
probability of the “no-information” event. The upshot is that trades occurring when 
trading intensity is high induce a larger update in beliefs, and therefore a larger 
adjustment in price.   
 
Does the order-flow/price relation depend on day of the week?  
 Another state-contingency that warrants attention is day-of-the-week 
effects.21 To test whether day-of-the-week matters, we partition our sample into five 
sub-samples, one for each weekday (recall that weekends are subsumed in our 
Friday-to-Monday observations). In both the DM and Yen equations, all five of the 
resulting order-flow coefficients are positive. In the DM equation, the Tuesday 
coefficient is the largest, and the Wednesday coefficient is the smallest. The Yen 
equation also shows that Tuesday’s coefficient is the largest, but in this case the 
Monday coefficient is smallest. More important, a Wald test that the coefficients are 
equal across the five days cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level in either equation 
(though in the case of the Yen, it can be rejected at the 10 percent level). 
 
5.3  Causality 
 
Under our model’s null hypothesis, causality runs strictly from order flow to 
price. Accordingly, under the null, our estimation is not subject to simultaneity bias. 
(We are not simply "regressing price on quantity," as in the classic supply-demand 
identification problem. Quantity—i.e., volume—and order flow are fundamentally 
different concepts.) Within microstructure theory more broadly, this direction of 
causality is the norm: it holds in all the canonical models (Glosten and Milgrom 
1985, Kyle 1985, Stoll 1978, Amihud and Mendelson 1980), despite the fact that 
price and order flow are determined simultaneously. The important point in these 
models is that price innovations are a function of order flow innovations, not the 
                                                   
21 In terms of theory, the model of Foster and Viswanathan (1990) is a workhorse for specifying day-
of-the-week effects. In their model, there is periodic variation in the information advantage of the 
informed trader. This advantage is assumed to grow over periods of market closure, in particular, 
over weekends, making order flow on Monday particularly potent.      22
other way around.22 That said, alternative hypotheses do exist under which causal-
ity is reversed.  The following taxonomy frames the causality issue, and identifies 
specific alternatives under which causality is reversed, so that the merits of these 
alternatives can be judged in a disciplined way.  
 
Theoretical Overview 
The timing of the order-flow/price relation admits three possibilities, depend-
ing on whether order flow precedes, is concurrent with, or lags price adjustment. We 
shall refer to these three timing hypotheses as the Anticipation hypothesis, the 
Pressure hypothesis, and the Feedback hypothesis, respectively.  
Within each of the three hypotheses—Anticipation, Pressure, and Feed-
back—there are also variations. Under the Anticipation hypothesis, for example, 
order flow can precede price adjustment because prices adjust fully only after order 
flow is commonly observed—in low-transparency markets like foreign exchange, 
order flow is not commonly observed when it occurs (Lyons 1996). Order flow might 
also precede price because price adjusts only after some piece of news anticipated by 
order flow is commonly observed (e.g., the short-lived private information in Foster 
and Viswanathan 1990). Under the Pressure hypothesis the two main variations 
correspond to microstructure theory’s canonical model types—information models 
and inventory models. In information models, observing order flow provides infor-
mation about payoffs (Glosten and Milgrom 1985, Kyle 1985). In inventory models, 
order flow alters equilibrium risk premia (Stoll 1978, Ho and Stoll 1981).23 Under 
the Feedback hypothesis, order flow lags price because of feedback trading. Nega-
tive-feedback trading is systematic selling in response to price increases, and buying 
in response to price decreases (e.g., Friedman’s celebrated “stabilizing speculators”). 
Positive-feedback trading is the reverse. Variations on the Feedback hypothesis are 
distinguished by whether this feedback trading is rational (an optimal response to 
                                                   
22 Put differently, order flow in these models is a proximate cause. The underlying driver of order flow 
is non-public information (information about uncertain demands, information about payoffs, etc.). 
Order flow is the channel through which this type of information is impounded in price.   
23  Within this inventory-model category, there is an additional distinction between price effects that 
arise at the marketmaker level (canonical inventory models) and price effects that arise at the 
marketwide level, due to imperfect substitutability (e.g., our Portfolio Shifts model). In the case of 
price effects at the marketmaker level, these effects are often modeled as changing risk premia. But 
sometimes, largely for technical convenience, models are specified with risk-neutral marketmakers 
who face some generic “inventory holding cost.”     23
return autocorrelation) or behavioral, meaning that it arises from systematic 
decision bias (DeLong et al. 1990, Jegadeesh and Titman 1993, Grinblatt et al. 
1995). 
Under the Pressure hypothesis, causality runs from order flow to price, de-
spite their concurrent realization.24 For the Anticipation hypothesis, the second 
variation noted above—where price adjusts only after some piece of news antici-
pated by order flow is observed—is probably not relevant to foreign exchange (in 
contrast to equity markets, where insider order flow can anticipate a firm’s earnings 
announcement, for example). The other variation of the Anticipation hypothesis—
where order flow affects price with a delay because it is not commonly observed—is 
relevant to foreign exchange. In this case, causality still runs from order flow to 
price, but the effects are delayed. As noted in the Data section, order flow in this 
market is not common knowledge when realized. Consequently, lags in price 
adjustment do not violate market efficiency (conditional on public information). One 
way to test this variation of the Anticipation hypothesis is by introducing lagged 
order flow to our Portfolio Shifts model. Rows 1 and 3 of Table 2 present the results 
of this regression: lagged order flow is insignificant. At the daily frequency, lagged 
order flow is already embedded in price.25  
Under the Feedback hypothesis, causality can go in reverse, that is, from 
price to order flow.26 Within exchange-rate economics, a natural first association is 
Friedman’s stabilizing speculators, which is negative-feedback trading (rational). 
Though the direction of causality in this case is reversed, one would expect to find an 
order-flow/price relation that is negative. We find a positive relation. If instead 
positive-feedback trading were present and significant, then one would expect order 
flow in period t to be positively related to the price change in period t-1. In daily 
data, this corresponds to Dxt being explained, at least in part, by Dpt-1. If our order-
                                                   
24 This does not imply that price cannot influence order flow. Price does influence order flow in 
microstructure models (both for the usual downward sloping demand reason, and because agents 
learn from price). It is still the case that—in equilibrium—price innovations are functions of order 
flow innovations, not vice versa. Our Portfolio Shifts model is a case in point. 
25 As another check along these lines, we also decompose contemporaneous order flow into expected 
and unexpected components (by projecting it on past order flow). In our model, all order flow Dx is 
unexpected, but this need not be the case in the data. We find, as the model predicts, that order flow’s 
explanatory power comes from its unexpected component. 
26 Note that the Feedback hypothesis does not imply that causality runs wholly in reverse. For 
example, the Feedback hypothesis does not rule out that feedback trading can affect prices.  
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flow coefficient in Table 1 is picking up this daily-frequency positive feedback, then 
including lagged price change Dpt-1 in the Portfolio-Shifts regression should weaken, 
if not eliminate, the significance of order flow. Rows 2 and 4 of Table 2 present the 
results of this regression. Past price change does not reduce the significance of order 
flow, and is itself insignificant. These results run counter to the positive-feedback 




Portfolio shifts model: Alternative specifications 
 
Dpt =  b1D(it–it*) + b2Dxt + b3Dxt-1 + ht 
 
Dpt =  b1D(it–it*) + b2Dxt + b3Dpt-1 + ht 
 



















               
DM  0.40  2.16  0.29    0.65  0.76  0.39 
  (0.36)  (0.18)  (0.19)   
 
  0.48  0.03 
  0.42  2.17    0.11  0.66  0.60  0.38 
  (0.35) 
 
 
(0.18)    0.07    0.44  0.01 
Yen  2.48  2.90  -0.20    0.47  0.07  0.55 
  (0.91)  (0.36)  (0.35)      0.41  0.84 
               
  2.64  2.98    -0.13  0.48  0.21  0.52 
  (0.91)  (0.36)    (0.09) 
 
  0.63  0.81 
 
The dependent variable Dpt is the change in the log spot exchange rate from 4 pm GMT on day t-1 to 
4 pm GMT on day t (DM/$ or ¥/$). The regressor D(it–it*) is the change in the one-day interest 
differential from day t-1 to day t (* denotes DM or ¥, annual basis). The regressor Dxt is interdealer 
order flow between 4 pm GMT on day t-1 and 4 pm GMT on day t (negative for net dollar sales, in 
thousands). Estimated using OLS. Standard errors are shown in parentheses (corrected for 
heteroskedasticity in the case of the DM). The sample spans four months (May 1 to August 31, 1996), 
which is 89 trading days. The Serial column presents the p-value of a chi-squared test for residual 
serial correlation, first-order in the top row and fifth-order (one week) in the bottom row. The Hetero 
column presents the p-value of a chi-squared test for ARCH in the residuals, first-order in the top 
row and fifth-order in the bottom row.   25
Empirical Reality  
 The theoretical overview above cannot resolve the fact that, in daily data, all 
three hypotheses—Anticipation, Pressure, and Feedback—may produce a relation-
ship that appears contemporaneous. A concern therefore remains that the positive 
coefficient on order flow in Table 1 might be the result of positive-feedback trading 
that occurs intraday. We offer two additional types of evidence against this alterna-
tive interpretation of our results. The first is a set of three arguments why intraday 
positive feedback is an unappealing hypothesis in this context. The second is an 
explicit analysis of bias, designed to calibrate how extreme the positive feedback 
would have to be to account for the key moments of our data. (These moments 
include, but are not limited to, the moments that produce our order-flow coefficient 
in Table 1.) 
There are three reasons, a priori, why the hypothesis of intraday positive-
feedback trading is unappealing. First, direct empirical evidence does not support it: 
there is no evidence in the current literature of positive-feedback trading in the 
foreign exchange market. Second, if systematic positive-feedback trading were 
present, it would be irrational: intraday studies using transactions data find no 
evidence of the positive autocorrelation in price that would make positive-feedback 
an optimal response (Goodhart, Ito, and Payne 1996). Third, the fallback possibility 
of irrational positive-feedback trading is difficult to defend. Recall that the order 
flow we measure is interdealer order flow. Though systematic feedback trading of a 
behavioral nature (i.e., not fully rational) might be a good description of some 




 To close this section on causality, let us consider what it would take for 
positive-feedback trading to account for our results. Specifically, suppose intraday 
positive-feedback trading is present—Under what conditions could it account for the 
key moments of our data? These moments include, but are not limited to, the 
moments that produce our positive order-flow coefficient in Table 1. We show below 
that these conditions are rather extreme. In fact, through a broad range of underly-  26
ing parameter values, feedback trading would have to be negative to account for the 
key moments of our data. 
 We start by decomposing measured order flow Dxt into two components: 
 
(8) Dxt  =  Dxt1  +  Dxt2 
 
where Dxt1 denotes exogenous order flow from portfolio shifts (a la our model), with 
variance equal to Sx1, and Dxt2 denotes order flow due to feedback trading, where 
 
(9) Dxt2  =  gDpt 
 
Suppose the true structural model can be written as: 
 
(10) Dpt  =   aDxt1  +   et 
where et represents common-knowledge (CK) news, and et is iid with variance Se. By 
CK news we mean that both the information and its implication for equilibrium 
price is common knowledge. If both conditions are not met, then order flow will 
convey information about market-clearing prices (recall the discussion in the 
introduction). If feedback trading is present (g„0), then a will be a reduced form 
coefficient that depends on g. Note that under these circumstances, equation (10) is a 
valid reduced-from equation that could be estimated by OLS if one had data on Dxt1.  
 With data on Dxt and Dpt only, suppose we estimate  
 
(11) Dpt  =   bDxt  +   et 
 
If  g„0, our estimates of b will suffer from simultaneity bias. To evaluate the size of 
this bias, consider the implications of equations (8) through (10) for the moments: 
 
    b  =  Cov(Dpt,Dxt) / Var(Dxt) 
    d  =  Var(Dpt) / Var(Dxt) 
 
From equations (8) through (10) we know that:   27
 
 Dxt  =  (1+ga)(Dxt1)  +   get 
 
Solving for expressions for Cov(Dpt,Dxt), Var(Dpt), and Var(Dxt), we can write: 
 
b  =  Cov(Dpt,Dxt) / Var(Dxt)  =  (a(1+ga)Sx1 + gSe) / ((1+ga)2Sx1 + g2Se) 
  d  =  Var(Dpt) / Var(Dxt)  =  (a2Sx1 + Se) / ((1+ga)2Sx1 + g2Se) 
 
Now, define an additional parameter: 
 
 f  =  Se/Sx1  
This parameter represents the ratio of CK news to order-flow news. With this 
parameter f we can rewrite the key coefficients as: 
 
b  =  (a(1+ga) + gf) / ((1+ga)2 + g2f) 
    d  =  (a2 + f) / ((1+ga)2 + g2f) 
 
Using the sample moments for Cov(Dpt,Dxt), Var(Dpt), and Var(Dxt), we can solve for 
the implied values of the a and g for given values of f. The following table presents 
these implied values of a and g.  
Note that even for values of f above 2, the feedback trading needed to gener-
ate our results is actually negative. Note too that the parameter a—the order-flow-
causes-price parameter—is not driven to zero until f reaches values well above 10. 
To invalidate our causality interpretation, then, CK news would have to be one to 
two orders of magnitude more important that order-flow news. In our judgment this 
is too extreme to be compelling. 
To close this section on causality, it is not enough for the skeptical reader to 
assert simply that order flow and price are both “endogenous,” or that we are merely 
observing a “simultaneous relationship.”  These points are true. But they are also 
true within the body of microstructure theory reviewed above. And within that body   28
of theory, price innovations are still driven by order flow innovations. This section is 






Dxt2  =  gDpt 












       
DM  0  2.4  –0.05 
  0.1  1.2  –0.51 
  1  1.9  –0.12 
  2  2.1  –0.03 
  10  2.0    0.16 
  100  0.0    0.36 
       
Yen  0  2.4  –0.18 
  0.1  1.3  –0.58 
  1  2.2  –0.23 
  2  2.4  –0.15 
  10  2.8  –0.02 
  100  0.0    0.21 
       
 
The table shows the values for the parameters a (order-flow-causes-price) and g (price-causes-order-
flow) implied by the sample moments and given values for the parameter f. The parameter f is the 
ratio of common-knowledge news to order-flow news.   
 
 
5.4  Out-of-Sample Forecasts 
 
To control for the myriad specification searches conducted by empiricists, a 
tradition within exchange rate economics has been to augment in-sample model 
estimates with estimates of models’ out-of-sample forecasting ability. Accordingly, 
we present results along these lines as well. The original work by Meese and Rogoff 
(1983a) examines forecasts from 1 to 12 months. Our four-month sample does not   29
provide sufficient power to forecast at these horizons. Our horizons range instead 
from one day to two weeks. The Meese-Rogoff puzzle is why short-horizon forecasts 
do so poorly, and our focus is definitely on the short end (though not so short as to 
render the horizon irrelevant from a macro perspective).  
Table 4 shows that the portfolio shifts model produces better forecasts than 
the random-walk (RW) model. The forecasts from our model are derived from 
recursive estimates that begin with the first 39 days of the sample. Like the Meese-
Rogoff forecasts, our forecasts are based on realized values of the future forcing 
variables—in our case, realized values of order flow and changes in the interest 
differential. (Thus, they are not truly “out-of-sample forecasts.” We chose to stick 
with the Meese-Rogoff terminology.) The resulting root mean squared error (RMSE) 
is 30 to 40 percent lower than that for the random walk.  
Note that our 89-day sample has very low power at the one- and two-week 
horizons. Even though our model’s RMSE estimates are roughly 35 percent lower at 
these horizons, their out-performance is not statistically significant. With a sample 
this size, the one-week forecast would need to cut the RW model’s RMSE by about 
50 percent to reach the 5 percent significance level. (To see this, note that for the 
DM a two-standard-error difference at the one-week horizon is about 0.49, which is 
roughly half of the RW model’s RMSE of 0.98). The two-week forecast would have to 
cut the RW model’s forecast error by some 54 percent. More powerful tests at these 
longer horizons will have to wait for longer spans of transaction data. 
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Table 4 
Out-of-sample forecasts errors 
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The RW column reports the RMSE for the random walk model (approximately in percentage terms). 
The Portfolio Shifts column reports the RMSE for the model in equation (6). The Portfolio Shifts 
forecasts are based on realized values of the forcing variables. The forecasts are derived from 
recursive model estimates starting with the first 39 days of the sample. The Difference column 
reports the difference in the two RMSE estimates, and, in parentheses, the standard errors for the 





6.  Discussion 
 
The relation in our model between exchange rates and order flow is not easy 
to reconcile with the traditional macro approach. Under the traditional approach, 
information is common knowledge and is therefore impounded in exchange rates 
without the need for order flow. This apparent contradiction can be resolved if 
either: (1) some information relevant for exchange rate determination is not common 
knowledge; or (2) some aspect of the mapping from information to equilibrium prices   31
is not common knowledge. If either is relaxed then order flow conveys information 
about market-clearing prices.  
 Our portfolio shifts model resolves the contradiction by introducing informa-
tion that is not common knowledge—information about shifts in public demand for 
foreign-currency assets. At a microeconomic level, dealers learn about these shifts in 
real time by observing order flow. As the dealers learn, they quote prices that reflect 
this information. At a macroeconomic level, these shifts are difficult to observe 
empirically. Indeed, the concept of order flow is not recognized within the interna-
tional macro literature. (Transactions, if they occur at all, are strictly symmetric, 
and therefore cannot be signed to reflect net buying/selling pressure.)  
 If order flow drives exchange rates, then what drives order flow? From a 
valuation perspective, there are two distinct views. The first view is that order flow 
reflects new information about valuation numerators (i.e., future dividends in a 
dividend-discount model, which in foreign exchange take the form of future interest 
differentials). The second view is that order flow reflects new information about 
valuation denominators (i.e., anything that affects discount rates). Our portfolio 
shifts model is an example of the latter: order flow is unrelated to valuation numera-
tors—the future rt. This type of order flow can be rationalized with, for example, 
time-varying risk tolerance, time-varying hedging demands, or time-vary transac-
tions demands. (In presenting the model, we did not take a stand on a specific 
rationalization.) An example consistent with the valuation-numerators view is the 
“proxy-for-expectations” idea introduced in the introduction. That is, an important 
source of innovations in exchange rates is innovations in expected future fundamen-
tals, and in real time these may be well proxied by order flow. 
Note that separating valuation numerators from valuation denominators has 
implications for the concept of “fundamentals.” Order flow that reflects information 
about valuation numerators—like expectations of future interest rates—is in 
keeping with traditional definitions of exchange-rate fundamentals. But order flow 
that reflects valuation denominators encompasses nontraditional exchange-rate 
determinants, calling, perhaps for a broader definition. In any event, exploring these   32
links to deeper determinants is a natural topic for future research. This will surely 
require a retreat back into intraday data.27 
 
The Practitioner View versus the Academic View  
Another perspective on order flow emerges from the difference between aca-
demic and practitioner views on price determination. Practitioners often explain 
price increases with the familiar reasoning that “there were more buyers than 
sellers.” To most economists, this reasoning is tantamount to “price had to rise to 
balance demand and supply.” But these phrases may not be equivalent. For econo-
mists, the phrase “price had to rise to balance demand and supply” calls to mind the 
Walrasian auctioneer. The Walrasian auctioneer collects “preliminary” orders and 
uses them to find the market-clearing price. Importantly, the auctioneer’s price 
adjustment is immediate—no trading occurs in the transition. (In a rational-
expectations model of trading, for example, this is manifested in all orders being  
conditioned on the market-clearing price.)  
Many practitioners have a different model in mind. In the practitioner model 
there is a dealer instead of an abstract auctioneer. The dealer acts as a buffer 
between buyers and sellers. The orders the dealer collects are actual orders, rather 
than preliminary orders, so trading does occur in the transition to the new price. The 
dealer determines new prices from the new information about demand and supply 
that becomes available.  
 Can the practitioner model be rationalized? At first blush, it appears that 
trades are taking place out of equilibrium, implying irrational behavior. But this 
misses an important piece of the puzzle. Whether these trades are out-of-equilibrium 
depends on the information available to the dealer. If the dealer knows at the outset 
that there are more buyers than sellers (eventually pushing price up), then it may 
not be optimal to sell at a low interim price. If the buyer/seller imbalance is not 
known, however, then rational trades can occur through the transition. In this case, 
the dealer cannot set price conditional on all the information available to the 
                                                   
27 The role of macro announcements in determining order flow warrants exploring. This, too, requires 
the use of intraday data. A second possible use of macro announcements is to introduce them directly 
into our Portfolio Shifts specification, even at the daily frequency. This tack is not likely to be fruitful: 
there is a long literature showing that macro announcements are unable to account for exchange rate 
first moments (as opposed to second moments; see Andersen and Bollerslev 1998).   33
Walrasian auctioneer. This is precisely the story developed in canonical microstruc-
ture models (Glosten and Milgrom 1985). Trading that would be irrational if the 
dealer could condition on the auctioneer's information can be rationalized in models 
with more limited (and realistic) conditioning information.  
 
Relation Between Our Model and the Flow Approach to Exchange Rates 
Consider the relation between our model, with its emphasis on order flow, 
and the traditional “flow approach” to exchange rates. Is our approach just a return 
to the earlier flow approach? Despite their apparent similarity, the two approaches 
are distinct and, in fact, fundamentally different.  
A key feature of our model is that order flow plays two roles. First, holding 
beliefs constant, order flow affects price through the traditional process of market 
clearing. Second, order flow also alters beliefs because it conveys information that is 
not yet common knowledge. That is: 
 
Price =  P(Dx, B(Dx,…),  …) 
 
Price P thus depends both directly and indirectly on order flow, Dx, where the 
indirect effect is via beliefs B. Early attempts to analyze equilibrium with differen-
tially informed individuals ignored the information role—the effect of order flow on 
beliefs. Since the advent of rational expectations, models that ignore this informa-
tion effect from order flow are viewed as less compelling.  
This is the essential difference between the flow approach to exchange rates 
and the microstructure approach. Under the flow approach, order flow communi-
cates no information back to individuals regarding others' views/information. All 
information is common knowledge, so there is no information that needs aggregat-
ing. Under the microstructure approach, order flow does communicate information 
that is not common knowledge. This information needs to be aggregated by the 
market, and microstructure theory describes how that aggregation is achieved, 
depending on the underlying information type.  
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7.  Conclusion 
 
This paper presents a model of exchange rate determination of a new kind. 
Instead of relying exclusively on macroeconomic determinants, we draw on determi-
nants from the field of microstructure. In particular, we focus on order flow, the 
variable within microstructure that is—both theoretically and empirically—the 
driver of price.28 This is a radical departure from traditional approaches to exchange 
rate determination. Traditional approaches, with their common-knowledge envi-
ronments, admit no role for information aggregation. Our findings suggest instead 
that the problem this market solves is indeed one of information aggregation.  
Our Portfolio Shifts model provides an explicit characterization of this infor-
mation aggregation problem. The model is also strikingly successful in accounting 
for realized rates. It accounts for more than 60 percent of daily changes in the DM/$ 
rate, and more than 40 percent of daily changes in the Yen/$ rate. Out of sample, 
our model produces better short-horizon forecasts than a random walk. Our esti-
mates of the sensitivity of the spot rate to order flow are sensible as well, and square 
with past estimates at the individual-dealer level. We find that for the DM/$ market 
as a whole,  $1 billion of net dollar purchases increases the DM price of a dollar by 
about 0.5 percent. This relation should be of particular interest to people working on 
central bank intervention (though care should be exercised in mapping central bank 
orders to subsequent interdealer trades).  
Two issues raised by our measure of order flow deserve some remarks. First, 
though our measure captures a substantial share of total trading, it remains 
incomplete. As data sets covering customer-dealer trading and brokered interdealer 
trading become available, the order-flow picture can be completed (see, e.g., Payne 
1999). A second interesting issue raised by our order-flow measure is whether its 
relation to price would change if order flow were observable to dealers in real time 
(i.e., if the market were more transparent). From a policy perspective, the effects of 
increasing order-flow transparency may be important: unlike most other financial 
                                                   
28 This primacy of order flow within microstructure should mitigate standard concerns about data 
snooping. (In the words of Richard Meese 1990, "At this point exchange rate modelers can be justly 
accused of in-sample data mining.") The variable we introduce—order flow—is the obvious a priori 
driving variable from microstructure theory.  
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markets, the FX market is unregulated in this respect. The welfare consequences 
are not yet well understood.  
So where do the results of this paper lead us? In our judgment they point to-
ward a research agenda that borrows from both the macro and microstructure 
approaches. It is not necessary to decouple exchange rates from macroeconomic 
fundamentals, as is common within microstructure finance. In this way, the 
approach is more firmly anchored in the broader context of asset pricing. (Though 
we freely admit that longer time series will be necessary to implement the macro 
dimension fully.) Nor is it necessary to treat exchange rates as driven wholly by 
public information, as is common within the macro approach. The information 
aggregation that arises when one reduces reliance on public information is well 
suited to microstructure: there are ample tools within the microstructure approach 
for addressing this aggregation. In the end, this two-pronged approach may help 
locate the missing middle in exchange rate economics—that disturbing space 
between our successful modeling of very short and very long horizons.  
We close by addressing the obvious challenge for this agenda: What drives 
order flow? Here are two strategies, among many, for shedding light on this ques-
tion. The first strategy involves disaggregating order flow. For example, interdealer 
order flow can be split into large banks versus small banks, or investment banks 
versus commercial banks. Data sets on customer order flow can be split into non-
financial corporations, leveraged financial institutions (e.g., hedge funds), and 
unleveraged financial institutions (e.g., mutual and pension funds). Do all these 
trade types have the same price impact? If not, whose trades are most informative? 
This will clarify the underlying sources of non-CK information, which brings us 
closer to a specification of this market’s information structure. The second strategy 
involves focusing on periods where we expect CK information to be most important, 
for example, periods encompassing scheduled macro announcements. Does order 
flow account for a smaller share of the price variation within these periods? Or is 
order flow an important channel for resolving uncertainty about the mapping from 
public information to price? Whatever the result, the important point is that the 
what-drives-order-flow question is not beyond our grasp.  
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Appendix:  Model Solution 
 
 
Each dealer determines quotes and speculative demand by maximizing a 
negative exponential utility function defined over terminal wealth. Because returns 
are independent across periods, with an unchanging stochastic structure, the 
dealers’ problem collapses to a series of independent trading problems, one for each 
period. Within a given period t, let Wit denote the end-of-round t wealth of dealer i, 
where we use the convention that Wi0 denotes wealth at the end of period t-1. (To 
ease the notational burden, we suppress the period subscript t when clarity per-
mits.) With this notation, and normalizing the gross return on the riskless asset to 
one, we can write the dealers’ problem as: 
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Pit is dealer i's round-t quote and a ¢ denotes an interdealer quote or trade received 
by dealer i. The dealers’ problem is defined over four choice variables: the three 
scalar quotes Pi1, Pi2, and Pi3, and the dealer’s outgoing interdealer trade in round 2, 
Ti2. This outgoing interdealer trade in round 2 has three components: 
 
(A2)  ] | [ 2 2 2 1 2 Ti i i i i T E D c T W ¢ + + =  
 
where Di2 is dealer i’s speculative demand in round 2, and E[T
¢
i2|WTi2] is the dealer’s 
attempt to hedge against incoming orders from other dealers (this term is zero in 
equilibrium). The last three terms in Wi3 capture capital gains/losses from round-1 
customer orders ci1, round-2 speculative demand Di2, and the round-2 position 
disturbance from incoming interdealer orders T
¢
i2. The conditioning information Wi at 
each decision node (3 quotes and 1 outgoing order) is summarized below.  
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This appendix repeatedly uses several conditional return variances. These 
variances do not depend on conditioning variables' realizations (e.g., they do not 
depend on dealer i's realization of ci1. These conditional variances are therefore 
common to all dealers and known in period one. (It is a convenient property of the 
normal distribution that realizations of conditioning variables affect the conditional   37
mean but not the precision of the condition mean.) This predetermination of 
conditional variances is key to the derivation of optimal quoting and trading rules. 
 
Equilibrium 
 The equilibrium concept we use is Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium, or BNE. 
Under BNE, Bayes rule is used to update beliefs and strategies are sequentially 
rational given those beliefs. 
Solving for the symmetric BNE, first we consider properties of optimal quot-
ing strategies.  
 
PROPOSITION 1:  A quoting strategy is consistent with symmetric BNE only if the 
round-one and round-two quotes are common across dealers and equal to:  
 
 P1,t  =  P2,t  =  P3,t-1 +  rt 
 
where P3,t-1 is the round-three quote from the previous period, and rt is the public-
information innovation at the beginning of period t. 
   
 
PROPOSITION 2:  A quoting strategy is consistent with symmetric BNE only if the 
common round-three quote is:  
 
 P3,t  =   P2,t  +   lDxt 
 
The constant l is strictly positive.  
 
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2 
 No arbitrage requires that all dealers post a common quote in all periods. 
(Recall from section 3 that all quotes are scalar prices at which the dealer agrees to 
buy/sell any amount, and trading with multiple partners is feasible.) Common prices 
require that quotes be conditioned on commonly observed information only. In 
rounds one and two, this includes the previous period’s round-three price, plus the 
public-information innovation at the beginning of period t, rt. (Dealer i’s round-two 
quote therefore cannot be conditioned on his realization of ci1.)  
 The equations that pin down the levels of these three prices embed the dealer 
and customer trading rules. When conditioned on public information, these trading 
rules must be consistent with equilibrium price. This implies the following key 
relations: 
 
(A3) E[ci1|WPi1]  +  E[Di2(P1,t)|WPi1]  = 0 
 
(A4) E[ci1|WPi1]  +  E[Di2(P2,t)|WPi1]  = 0 
 
(A5) E[Sici1|WPi3]  +  E[c3(P3,t)|WPi3]  = 0 
  
The first two equations simply state that, in expectation, dealers must be willing to 
absorb the demand from customers. The third equation states that, in expectation, 
the public must be willing at the round-3 price to absorb the period’s aggregate   38
portfolio shift. These equations pin down equilibrium price because any price except 
that which satisfies each would generate net excess demand in round-2 interdealer 
trading, which cannot be reconciled since dealers trade among themselves.  
 That P1,t=P2,t=P3,t-1+rt follows directly from the fact that expected value of ci1 
conditional on public information WPi1 is zero, and expected speculative dealer 
demand Di2 is also zero at this public-information-unbiased price. To be more 
precise, this statement postulates that the dealer’s demand Di2 has this property; we 
show below in the derivation of the optimal trading rule that this is the case.  
 That P3,t=P2,t+lDxt follows from the fact that Dxt is a sufficient statistic for 
the period’s aggregate portfolio shift Sici1. Given the aggregate portfolio shift must be 
absorbed by the public in round 3, P3,t must adjust to induce the necessary public 
demand. Specifically, the round-3 price must satisfy: 
 
c3(P3,t)  =  –Sici1    
 
Given the optimal rule for determining Ti2 (which we establish below), we can write 
Sici1 in terms of interdealer order flow Dxt as: 
 
Sici1  =  (1/a)Dxt 
 
and since the specification of c3 in the text is: 
 
c3  =  g(E[P3,t+1|W3] –P3,t) 
 
this implies a market-clearing round-3 price of: 
 
 
P3,t  =  E[P3,t+1|W3] +  (ag)-1Dxt 
 
        = ( ) ￿ = D +
t
1 i i i x r l  
 
with l=(ag)-1, which is unambiguously positive. This sum is the expected payoff on 
the risky asset (the ri terms), adjusted for a risk premium, which is determined by 
cumulative portfolio shifts (the Dxi terms). This yields equation (5) in the text: 
 
 
(5) DPt =  rt   +  lDxt 
 
where DPt denotes the change in price from the end of round 3 in period t-1 to the 
end of round 3 in period t. 
 
Equilibrium Trading Strategies 
 An implication of common interdealer quotes P2,t is that in round 2 each 
dealer receives a share 1/(N-1) of every other dealer’s interdealer trade. This order 
corresponds to the position disturbance T
¢
i2 in the dealer's problem in equation (A1).   39
Given the quoting strategy described in propositions 1 and 2, the following 
trading strategy is optimal and corresponds to symmetric linear equilibrium: 
 
PROPOSITION 3:  The trading strategy profile: 
 
Ti2  =  a ci1 
   
"i ˛ {1,...,N}, with a>0,  conforms to a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: Optimal Trading Strategies 
 
As noted above, because returns are independent across periods, with an un-
changing stochastic structure, the dealers’ problem collapses to a series of independ-
ent trading problems, one for each period. Because there are only N dealers, 
however, each dealer acts strategically in the sense that his speculative demand 
depends on the impact his trade will have on subsequent prices.   
It is well known that if a random variable W is distributed N(m,s2) and the 
utility function U(W)= –exp(–qW), then:  
 
(A6)  E[U(W)] =  –exp[–q(m – qs2/2)] 
 
Maximizing  E[U(W)] is therefore equivalent to maximizing (m – qs2/2). This result 
allows us to write the dealers speculative-demand problem as: 
 
(A7)        Max    i2 D (E[P3|WTi2]–P2)  –  
2
i2 D (q/2)s2 
         Di2 
 
where the information set WTi2 is defined above, and s2 denotes the conditional 
variance of  E[P3|WTi2]–P2. Now, from Proposition 2, we can write: 
 
(A8)  E[P3|WTi2] – P2  =  E[lDx|WTi2]  
 
And from the definitions of WTi2 and Dx we know that: 
 
(A9)  E[lDx|WTi2]  =  lTi2 
 
The expected value of the other dealers' trades in Dx is 0 under our specification 
because (i) customer trades are mean-zero and independent across dealers and (ii) 
there is no information in the model other than customer trades to motivate 
speculative demand. This fact also implies that dealer i's trade in round 2, Ti2 from 
equation (A2), is equal to: 
 Ti2 = Di2 + ci1 
 
Therefore, we can write the dealer's problem as: 
 
(A10)        Max    i2 D l(Di2 + ci1)  –  
2
i2 D (q/2)s2 
         Di2   40
The first-order condition of this problem is: 
 
(A11) 2lDi2 +  ci1  –  qs2Di2  =  0 
 
 
which implies a speculative demand of: 
 
(A12)  1 2 2 2
1











This demand function and the fact that Ti2=Di2+ci1  imply: 
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